





Institutions have a decisive importance in determin-
ing how labour markets function. They place con-
straints on the individual behaviour of market partic-
ipants and in so doing they may direct it in a certain
direction.Institutions can reduce uncertainty and con-
tribute to stabilising expectations. They may take the
form of laws, ordinances, and legal precedents togeth-
er with moral precepts, norms and customs.
The scientific analysis concerns itself,on the one hand,
with the origin and evolution of labour market insti-
tutions.Ideally,they are created in order to reduce in-
efficiency due to market failure,in order to correct the
distribution of earnings and in order to increase the
security of income.Interest groups can also give rise to
institutions (Blau and Kahn 1999).On the other hand,
analysis of institutions is also concerned with their ef-
fects. By means of aggregate analysis of effects and
microeconomic evaluation one seeks to estimate the
influence exerted by labour market institutions on
certain indicators or the influence they exert on mar-
ket participants directly affected.
Whilst these two areas of analysis have received a
great deal of attention, the labour market institu-
tions themselves have been mostly neglected.But in-
stitutional arrangements must be captured adequate-
ly if one is to have an explanation for their origins and
if their effects are to be understood. Capturing insti-
tutions requires that the domain regulated by an in-
stitution should be clearly defined and delimited.
What is more, it is necessary to formulate a theoreti-
cal concept that can serve as the basis for capturing
the institutions. Furthermore, the institutions must be
investigated empirically. Apart from the assessment
of institutional arrangements, qualitative information
must be transformed into quantitative information.
And finally,it may prove to be necessary to aggregate
individual indicators to a composite indicator.
The following article deals with capturing formal
labour market institutions. Section 2 defines labour
market institutions and presents the domains ruled
by them. Section 3 provides a survey of the most im-
portant sets of data available for international com-
parisons. Section 4 presents the measurement con-
cepts that are most prevalent and analyses the prob-
lems that arise in connection with the measurement
of institutions. In sections 5 to 8, the institutional ar-
rangements regarding employment protection, wage
bargaining, the social security system as well as ac-
tive labour market policy, and taxing labour are re-
viewed and the concepts on which they are based are
analysed. Section 9 deals with the characteristics of
institutions that up till now have been neglected
when capturing labour market institutions.The sum-
mary in section 10 concludes the article.
Definitions and domains
Labour market institutions are defined here by gen-
erally known rules that are designed to give struc-
ture to the recurring interactions in the labour mar-
ket. If the enforcement of these rules involves re-
course to the state’s monopoly of the use of coercive
force, then the institutions are referred to as formal
institutions. Examples of such institutions are laws,
ordinances and legal decisions. Institutions whose
enforcement does not involve recourse to the state
are referred to as informal institutions. Moral con-
cepts, norms and customs are examples of such insti-
tutions (Voigt 2002).
Interdependencies exist between informal and for-
mal institutions. Informal institutions may supple-
ment formal institutions or may be a condition for
their existence (Agell 1999). For instance, the gener-
ous safety net provided for by the Danish “flexicuri-
ty” model relies strongly on public spiritedness. A
lack of public spiritedness would raise moral hazard,
which would hinder the implementation of an effi-
cient programme of public employment insurance
(Algan and Cahuc 2005). On the other hand, infor-
mal institutions can impair the effectiveness of for-
mal institutions. If for example the population has
strong feelings about “fairness” in the sense of a low
wage spread, then wage reductions as a result of de-
centralising wage negotiations will be difficult to at-
tain (Bewley 2004).
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The nature of the legal system affects, to a large ex-
tent,the character of institutional systems.This influ-
ence is quite distinct,depending on whether the legal
system is based on English common law or whether
it is based on civil (or statutory) law. Common law is
characterised by the importance of decision making
by juries, by independent judges, emphasis on judi-
cial discretion as opposed to the dominance of codi-
fied law. The system of common law evolved origi-
nally in England and was transplanted to English-
speaking countries. Civil law is characterised by a
less independent judiciary and gives a greater role to
codified substantive and procedural rules. It evolved
out of Roman law and has been incorporated into
the civil codes of France and Germany and taken
over by many countries on the European continent
and by Japan (Botero et al. 2003, 7-9).
Following Botero et al.(2003),formal labour market
institutions may be assigned to the categories of em-
ployment law, of industrial and collective relations
law, and social security law. Employment laws gov-
ern the individual employment relationship, includ-
ing the nature of labour contracts, the terms of the
contract and the termination of the employment re-
lationship. Laws on industrial relations and collec-
tive relations regulate the process of wage bargain-
ing and the adoption and enforcement of collective
agreements; they also form the legal basis for trade
unions and they lay down the framework for work-
ers’ or employers’ industrial action. Social security
laws govern the social response to individual needs.
They deal with old age, disability, illness and unem-
ployment (Table 1). In addition to the three areas of
regulation just mentioned, in the literature on this
subject active labour market policy (in addition to
the already mentioned passive measures) and taxa-
tion of labour income are also reckoned among la-
bour market institutions affecting the development
of labour markets (Nickell et al. 2005; Checchi and
Lucifora 2002, 374). Occasionally regulations of pro-
duct markets, barriers to labour mobility, the institu-
tional system relevant to private households and the
system of vocational and further training are also in-
cluded amongst labour market institutions (Schütz
et al. 1998).
Data sets
For a long time labour market effects of institutions
received scant attention.As a result, the task of col-
lecting information on labour market institutions
was neglected. Before the 1990s, very little work on
the measurement of labour market institutions was
carried out. Since then work in this area has been
more extensive and efforts have been made to col-
lect data that are internationally comparable. Consid-
erable improvement in the quality of measurement
has been made. International organisations, and in
particular the OECD,have played an important role
in this work. Theoretical and empirical research in
the social sciences has also contributed to progress
in this area.
In Table 2 the principal sources of internationally
comparable data on formal labour market institu-
tions provided by international organisations are list-
ed.The following data sets are of particular interest:
– Employment protection is captured by the







– Family member contracts
Conditions of employment
– Flexibility of working time requirements
– Mandatory payment for non-working days
– Minimum wage legislation
Job security
– Grounds for dismissal
– Procedures for dismissal
– Notice period
– Severance payment
– Constitutional principles covering protections
against dismissal
Industrial (collective) relations law
Collective bargaining
– Duty to bargain with unions
– Extension laws
– Closed shops
Workers' participation in management
– Mandatory appointment of workers to the
board of directors 
– Workers council by law
Collective disputes
– Legal strikes 
– Procedural restrictions to strikes 
– Employer defences
– Compulsory arbitration
– Constitutional protection of the right to strike
Social security laws
Old age, disability and death benefits
– Required time of contributions to access a benefit
– Contributions as a percentage of the worker's
monthly salary
– Replacement rate




  Source: Botero et al. 2003.the late 1980s, the late 1990s
and 2003. The employment
protection of regular workers
against individual dismissal,
the specific requirements for
collective dismissals and the re-
gulation of temporary forms of
employment are summarised
by means of 22 (in some cases
18) single indicators.
– The characteristics of wage-set-
ting institutions (trade union
density, collective bargaining
coverage,the centralisation and
coordination of wage bargain-
ing) are analysed in the OECD
Employment Outlook 1994,
1997 and 2004.
– Social security laws are de-
scribed in the European Com-
mission’s MISSOC database
and by Social Security Pro-
grams Throughout the World.
The effects of social benefits
on incomes of working-age in-
dividuals and their families
are analysed in the OECD stu-
dy Benefits and Wages (2004a).
Information on active labour
market policies is included in
the OECD Employment Out-
look.
– The best information on labour
taxes is provided by the OECD
in Taxing Wages (2005).
Comparable information on la-
bour market institutions are also
supplied by the reports and data-
bases of the Fraser Institute, the
Heritage Foundation,Incomes Da-
ta Services, the International In-
stitute for Management Development, Lausanne,
Watson Wyatt Data Services and the World Economic
Forum.
Both the quantity and the quality of information on
formal labour market institutions have improved in
recent years. But there are also lacunae in available
data that need to be closed.With respect to some in-
stitutional areas, such as court decisions, there is on-
ly scarce information. Information on the degree of
implementation of institutional arrangements is lack-
ing, as is information on the number of persons that
are affected by certain arrangements. Then too, the
concepts on which the collection of information is
based must be further developed. And finally, the
methods of measurement must be improved.
Measurement
As a rule,the measurement of labour market institu-
tions is carried out with a certain problem in mind.
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Table 2 
Sources of data on formal labour market institutions for international
comparisons
General
– OECD Employment Outlook, various issues
– OECD Economic Department Working Papers
– European Commission, Employment in Europe, various issues
– European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO)
– EUROSTAT, New Cronos database
– ILO  databases
– CESifo DICE database for institutional comparisons
Employment laws
Employment contracts and conditions of employment
–  EIRO, Comparative studies and EMIRE
– OECD Employment Outlook, various issues
Job security
–  OECD, Employment Outlook1999, ch. 2 and 2004, ch. 2
– World Bank, Doing business
Industrial (collective) relations law
Collective bargaining
–  OECD, Employment Outlook1997, ch. 3 and 2004, ch. 3
–  EIRO, Comparative studies and EMIRE
– Blanpain E., ed., International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial
Relations
– European Industrial Relations Review
Workers' participation in management and collective disputes
– Blanpain E., ed., International Encyclopaedia for Labour Law and
Industrial Relations
–  EIRO, Comparative studies and EMIRE
– European Industrial Relations Review
Social security laws and active labour market policies
– European Commission, Mutual Information System on Social
Protection in the EU Members States and the EEA (MISSOC)
– Social Security Programs Throughout the World
–  OECD, Benefit and Wages, various issues
–  International Social Survey Programme 
– OECD Employment Outlook, various issues
Labour taxes
– OECD, Taxing Wages, various issues
Comparable informationonlabour market institutions are also suppliedby the
reports anddatabases of the Fraser Institute, the Heritage Foundation,
Incomes Data Services, the International Institute for Management
Development, Lausanne, Watson Wyatt Data Services and the World
Economic Forum. 
Individual researchers have made important contributions on the concept and 
measurement of labour market institutions. See the references in: Boeri et al.
(2001);Kenworthy (2001b); OECD, Benefits and Wages 2004a and OECD,
Employment Outlook 2004, ch.2 and 3.
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The first step is to define the institution. Then one
proceeds to make the concept on which the collec-
tion of information about the institution is based sus-
ceptible to measurement. For this purpose, the sepa-
rate dimensions of the concept must be worked out
in greater detail. In the case of employment protec-
tion these would be the period of notice required,
the amount of severance pay,the definition of unfair
dismissal etc.
The method of capturing formal institutions consists
in the summing-up, interpretation and assessment of
laws, ordinances and court decisions by experts. An
example of what is meant by summing-up and inter-
pretation is provided by the OECD’s description of
employment protection regulations (OECD 2004b,
background material for chapter 2). As a rule, as-
sessments are made by assigning scores.Since labour
market institutions are typically multidimensional,
the task of reducing them to quantitative indices is
not simple. Scores may be assigned along a metric
scale (e.g. the strictness of employment protection
along a scale of one to six, with higher scores repre-
senting stricter regulation; OECD 2004b, Annex 2.
A1). Or the scores may be based on rank (OECD
1999,tables 2.2 – 2.5).Internationally comparable as-
sessments may be carried out centrally, or decentral-
ly at the level of individual countries.
In some cases, individual indicators are aggregated to
form a composite indicator. Owing to their ability to
integrate large amounts of information into an easily
understood result, such composite indicators are use-
ful. In constructing composite indicators the relevant
indicators are standardised in order to allow compar-
isons. The indicators are weighted according to their
significance and then aggregated (Freudenberg 2003).
For instance, in constructing a summary measure for
the strictness of employment protection, the OECD
started from 18 indicators, which
were converted into cardinal
scores ranging from 0 to 6.These
indicators were then aggregated
in a four-step procedure based in
this case on an arbitrary weighting
scheme. A variety of difficulties
can arise when constructing a
composite indicator. Outcomes
and country rankings may depend
largely on the approach selected.
For this reason, sensitivity tests
should be conducted to analyse
the impact of using different stan-
dardisation techniques, changing weights, etc. on the
results of the composite indicator.
The measurement of labour market institutions should
be as objective,reliable and valid as possible.Objec-
tivity expresses the extent to which the results of
measurement are independent of the person that
uses the instrument. Reliability is an indication of
whether the results of measurement can be dupli-
cated.Validity refers to the extent to which theoret-
ical concepts are captured by the indicators (Dieck-
mann 1998, 216-227), a criterion that is particularly
important. We therefore discuss the problems that
can occur with the measurement of labour market
institutions with regard to this criterion.
Problems of validity may arise in collecting interna-
tionally comparable data on labour market institu-
tions,whenever institutions have evolved in different
contexts. An example of this is given by institutions
that have evolved in a society with a common law
tradition as opposed to the civil law tradition of con-
tinental European countries. In such a case a uni-
form concept and similar indicators do not necessar-
ily adequately reflect the institutions under study.
For example, the strictness of employment protec-
tion in the Anglo-Saxon countries cannot be regis-
tered with the use of indicators that are primarily
geared to codified laws.And vice versa, it would not
be suitable to examine the dismissal protection reg-
ulations of continental European countries using in-
dicators that are primarily based on legal precedents
(court decisions). One approach to overcoming this
problem is to replace the identity of concepts and in-
dicators by the functional equivalence of concepts
and indicators (Kenworthy and Kittel 2003, 22).
“Functional equivalence refers to the requirement
that concepts (in one setting, W.O.) should be relat-
ed to concepts in other settings in more or less the
UNIFORM VERSUS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS AND 
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING INSTITUTIONS
Source: Own design.
C1: concepts and indicators for measuring institutions in a common law tradition





















option 1 option 2same way” (van Deth 1998, 6).The comparability of
measuring concepts can be derived only from their
relationship to a common point of reference (Fig-
ure). Measurement concepts are equivalent to the
degree to which “[the] results provided by [them,
W.O.] reliably describe with (nearly) the same valid-
ity a particular phenomena in different social sys-
tems” (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 108).
Furthermore the validity may be impaired by the
method of data collection employed.If the assessment
of institutional arrangements in different countries is
carried out centrally, e.g. by a supranational organisa-
tion, then the problem can arise that national surveys,
reports and other source materials on which the as-
sessment is based have been prepared for purposes
which differ from the assessment and which further-
more differ from one country to another. As a conse-
quence, the information in the individual countries
may be different with respect to its type, content and
breakdown.What is more, the availability of informa-
tion may be very different from one country to anoth-
er. This may refer to the content of regulatory mea-
sures, to the degree to which they are actually imple-
mented and to the number of persons that are affected
by them.All of these factors make it difficult to assess
national sources.In many cases,organisations conduct-
ing central assessments are forced to work with avail-
able information on a lowest common denominator
basis. Such problems do not arise when specific inter-
national surveys are used as a basis of the assessment.
If the assessment of institutional conditions is carried
out decentrally by experts in each country,then the as-
sessment is facilitated, since as a rule, local experts
have more intimate knowledge of conditions in the
country than foreign experts. But different kinds of
problems arise in this case. In making international
comparisons it is difficult to ensure that national ex-
perts employ the same standard in assessing institu-
tional arrangements and that when they assign scores
they take into account the relative position of a coun-
try in relation to other countries.These difficulties are
exemplified by the assessment of hiring and firing
practices in different countries presented in the
Global Competitiveness Report 2004–2005 of the
World Economic Forum (2004). The Forum surveys
business leaders with respect to their assessment of
hiring and dismissal practices in their own countries
(World Economic Forum 2004, 599); the questions are
couched in terms of a scoring on a scale from one (hir-
ing and firing of workers is impeded by regulations) to
seven (… is flexibly determined by employers).With a
score of 2.2, Germany occupies place 102 among 104
countries,just ahead of France (place 103),but behind
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.At the same time,
the World Bank (2005) in its Doing Business Report
for 2006 and the OECD (2004b, 117, column 13) both
consider Germany’s hiring and firing regulations to be
less restrictive than those of the countries just men-
tioned.The difference in ranking may be due to the as-
sessment being based on different conceptual ap-
proaches. But one cannot exclude the possibility that
the German experts in the World Economic Forum
approached the task of assessing Germany’s labour
market flexibility in a more “pessimistic” frame of
mind than their foreign counterparts with respect to
their own countries. In such a case one might attempt
to make the assessment standard more comparable
between the countries involved by engaging the ex-
perts in an organised exchange of views.
And finally, the method employed in forming com-
posite indicators may give rise to problems of validi-
ty. Indicators which are aggregated to a composite in-
dicator have to be weighted.They may be given equal
weights or differing weights reflecting their signifi-
cance.The relative economic impact of the base indi-
cators can be determined by economic theory or by
empirical analysis (e.g. regression analysis, principal
component analysis or factor analysis) examining the
interrelationship among these indicators.Weights can
also be set based on correlation coefficients between
indicators and a dependent variable such as strictness
of employment protection (Freudenberg 2003,12).In-
dicators can also be weighted by experts who under-
stand the data and are familiar with the theoretical
context. But often transparency is not present. In
many composite indicators all base indicators are giv-
en the same weight largely for reasons of simplicity.
Inappropriate weighting may result in misleading com-
posite indicators.
Employment protection
In addition to the solution of the measurement prob-
lems, the analysis of labour market institutions pre-
supposes that suitable analytical concepts be devel-
oped for the individual regulatory areas. In the fol-
lowing the most important concepts for four regula-
tory areas will be introduced and discussed. We be-
gin with the area of employment protection.
According to the OECD (1999, 50), the term “em-
ployment protection”refers both to regulations con-
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cerning hiring as well as firing. In the first instance,
the relevant regulations concern the conditions un-
der which fixed-term contracts may be concluded,
which offer the possibility of circumventing the pro-
visions of protection against dismissal within a regu-
lar employment relationship. Regulations with re-
spect to dismissal concern both the individual termi-
nation of a regular employment relationship and col-
lective dismissals. The protection of regularly em-
ployed workers against dismissal represents a re-
striction on employers, who are no longer free to
give notice to their employees without justification.
This restriction has been attained through two types
of sanctions: the obligation to continue the employ-
ment relationship despite notice having been given
or severance pay.The prior condition for the general
protection against wrongful dismissal to be effective
is that an employment relationship should in fact ex-
ist, i.e. that someone is in a position of dependent
gainful employment. And finally, there are certain
conditions that must be fulfilled if collective dis-
missal is to be legally justified.
Capturing employment protection is difficult. The
arrangements that exist as a result of constitutional
provisions, legal measures or collective agreements
are complex and the documentation of their imple-
mentation is incomplete. The complexity becomes
apparent when for example the OECD employs not
less than eight indicators of protection against dis-
missal of employees with regular employment con-
tracts: notification procedure; delay involved before
notice can be given; length of notice period; sever-
ance pay; definition of unfair dismissal; length of tri-
al period; compensation following unfair dismissal;
and possibilities of obtaining reinstatement after un-
fair dismissal (Table 3). In order to identify the pro-
visions applicable in this area it is necessary to ana-
lyse very carefully the laws, ordinances and wage
agreements. But this is only the first step; one must
also take into the account how these provisions are
implemented and enforced.And this is up to courts,
arbitration boards and the public administration in
general. Courts of law, for example, interpret how
the law is to be applied, decide on the reinstatement
of employees in the event of wrongful dismissal, and
determine the amount of severance pay,etc.Further-
more,it is of interest to know what proportion of em-
ployees take legal action in a court of law to make
good their right to seek protection against wrongful
dismissal; it is equally interesting to know how often
such legal action is successful.There is a similar need
for information about the decisions of arbitration
boards and the public administration. Administra-
tive records represent an important source of infor-
mation with respect to the implementation and en-
forcement of employment protection (Bertola et al.
1999 and 2000).
Table 3 
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13. Restrictions on number of renewals
































15. Definitionof collective dismissal
16. Additional notification requirements
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  Source: OECD Employment Outlook2004, p. 106.If capturing employment protection in one country
is a problem, then obtaining data for international
comparisons is all the more difficult, since one must
make sure that the information used should be in-
ternationally comparable. If one goes beyond cross-
section comparisons and attempts a panel analysis,
then the concept employed in capturing employment
protection must be adjusted to take into account its
evolution in the course of time. Basic changes in the
regulatory framework must be taken into account as
must the emergence of new forms of employment re-
lationships such as fixed-term contracts. As far as
possible, one must ensure that concepts are func-
tionally equivalent.
One approach to quantifying the strictness of em-
ployment protection in inter-country comparisons is
to use surveys. The survey results form the basis for
rankings. Such surveys were carried out for the first
time in 1985. The International Association of Em-
ployers commissioned surveys in 14 countries de-
signed to assess the severity of rules restraining the
termination of employment contracts. In the same
year, the Commission of the European Union con-
ducted a survey of entrepreneurs in 9 EU countries.
In this survey the respondents were asked to assess
the employment effect of shorter periods of notice of
dismissal, of simpler legal procedures, and of a re-
duction in redundancy payments (Emerson 1988, re-
views the results of these surveys). Bertola (1990)
based his rankings of ten industrial countries on the
information obtained from these surveys.At the pre-
sent time, organisations such as Watson Wyatt Data
Services, Incomes Data Services and the World Eco-
nomic Forum carry out surveys.
Whilst the surveys mentioned above request infor-
mation about the general assessment of the strict-
ness of employment protection,
the OECD’s work in this area
has been based on a number of
indicators. Taking Lazear (1990)
as a point of departure, who only
considered two obstacles to firing
workers, Grubb and Wells (1993)
and the OECD Job Study (1994b)
considered eight indicators refer-
ring to obstacles to dismissal of
employees with regular contracts
(indicators one to eight in Table 3).
They also consider the possibili-
ties of circumventing general pro-
tection of employment by means
of fixed-term contracts and temporary work agency
employment. Regulatory efforts in these two areas
are represented by a further six indicators (indica-
tors nine to fourteen in Table 3). In the OECD’s
Employment Outlook 1999 and 2004 these studies
have been broadened by the inclusion of indicators
bearing on collective dismissal (indicators fifteen to
eighteen in Table 3).The descriptions of these 18 in-
dicators are based on a variety of national sources as
well as multi-country surveys by Watson Wyatt Data
Services, Incomes Data Services and the European
Commission. OECD governments provided addi-
tional information based on a request for informa-
tion from the OECD Secretariat (OECD 1999, 90).
In order to allow for meaningful comparisons,a four-
step procedure has been developed for constructing
cardinal summary indicators of strictness of employ-
ment protection. The 18 indicators are initially ex-
pressed in units of time (e.g. months of notice), as a
cardinal number (e.g. maximum number of succes-
sive fixed-term contracts allowed), or as a score on
an ordinal scale (0 to 2, 3, 4 or simply yes/no).These
first-level measures are accounted for in comparable
units and then converted into cardinal scores ranging
from 0 to 6.This scoring algorithm is somewhat arbi-
trary (OECD 1999, Table 2.B.1 and OECD 2004b,
Table 2.A.1.1). The three remaining steps consist in
forming successive weighted averages, thus construct-
ing three sets of summary indicators that correspond
to successively more aggregated measures of strictness
of employment protection (OECD 1999, Annex 2 B;
OECD 2004b,Annex 2.A.1; and Table 3).
The OECD summary indicators of the strictness of em-
ployment protection rank the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Ireland and New Zealand as the
OECD member countries providing in 2003 the least
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Table 4 







United States 0.7 Czech Republic 1.9 Norway 2.6
Canada 1.1 Korea 2.0 Sweden 2.6
United Kingdom 1.1 Slovak Republic 2.0 France 2.9
Ireland 1.3 Finland 2.1 Greece 2.9
New Zealand 1.3 Poland 2.1 Spain 3.1
Austria 1.5 Austria 2.2 Mexico 3.2
Switzerland 1.6 Netherlands 2.3 Portugal 3.5
Hungary 1.7 Italy 2.4 Turkey 3.5
Denmark 1.8 Belgium 2.5
Japan 1.8 Germany 2.5
a) Summary indicator for regular and temporary employment and collective 
dismissals. –
b) Higher scores represent stricter regulation.
Source: OECD (2004b, 117).CESifo DICE Report 4/2005 47
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employment protection.The results of the OECD sur-
vey indicate that the strictest protection against dis-
missal is to be found in three southern European coun-
tries: Greece, Spain and Portugal and in the threshold
countries Mexico and Turkey (Table 4). For the 28
countries shown in Table 4, the country rankings pro-
posed by the OECD differ considerably from the rank-
ings of the World Economic Forum (2004, 599).
Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation is only 0.58.
The indicator of the strictness of employment pro-
tection developed by the OECD is in all likelihood
the best indicator that is available at the moment for
the purpose of making international comparisons in
this area.Important areas of regulation are taken in-
to account. The choice of 18 indicators goes far to
take adequately into account the complexity of the
problem. Nevertheless, the OECD’s approach does
have some weaknesses:
– The OECD focuses on laws and ordinances bearing
on protection against wrongful dismissal, but de-
votes little attention to other areas such as the sys-
tem of social security which also may provide pro-
tection against loss of employment.One such mech-
anism is the system of experience rating in the
United States where an employer’s social security
contribution depends in part on the firm’s lay-off
activity.Then too, the interaction of the protection
against dismissal with other labour market institu-
tions must be taken into account if the actual level
of protection is to be determined.As Belot and van
Ours (2000) have shown, such interactions may re-
inforce or undermine the level of protection.
– The OECD’s measure of employment protection
is mainly based on legislative provisions. Protec-
tion against dismissal that is a part of wage agree-
ments or of individual employment contracts (e.g.
provisions for severance pay) is neglected.
– Similarly,the question to what extent the employ-
ment protection legislation is actually enforced
receives too little attention. Up till now there has
not been an adequate response to Bertola et al.’s
(1999) plea for the enforcement of employment
protection to be taken into account. The imple-
mentation of regulatory measures that are based
on legal dispositions is primarily in the hands of
labour tribunals.They interpret the law and hand
down decisions on the cases brought before them.
The stringency of the employment protection ac-
tually afforded to workers depends to a great ex-
tent on these decisions.The importance of labour
tribunals, however, varies greatly from one coun-
try to another. According to a survey conducted
by the ILO in Spain in 1995,five employees out of
a thousand instituted proceedings in a labour tri-
bunal, whilst in Ireland only one out of a thou-
sand took such action. In Spain 72 percent of
those who took legal action received a favourable
verdict, whereas in Ireland the employees won in
only 16 percent of the cases (Bertola et al. 1999,
23). Other disputes are resolved by arbitration
boards. It is difficult to collect systematic infor-
mation on judicial and other resolution of labour
disputes (e.g. on the number of cases in litigation,
how long they are pending and how they are re-
solved) and work in this area has only just begun.
– The OECD provides no information on the pro-
portion of employees that are covered by employ-
ment protection.It thus does not take into account
that legal provisions, wage agreements, court deci-
sions etc.exist which preclude giving regular notice
of dismissal to certain clearly defined categories of
employees (e.g. older employees, or those who
have worked in the production unit for a certain
period). On the other hand, it does not take into
account that the application of employment pro-
tection may depend on the production unit being
larger than a minimum size and/or that there may
be provisions requiring a waiting period; persons
economically active in a production unit that have
the formal legal status of self-employed (e.g.a sub-
contractor) but are deemed to be dependent em-
ployees or workers in the informal sector may not
be covered by the employment protection provi-
sions either (Rebhahn 2003, 190-194).
– Converting the first-level indicators of employ-
ment protection legislation into cardinal scores
and the assignment of weights is somewhat arbi-
trary (Addison and Teixeira 2001,10-14).“The as-
signment of scores and weights adds a subjective
dimension to the EPL strictness scores that is ad-
ditional to the judgements already embodied in
the… descriptive indicators” (OECD 1999, 117).
The extent to which the OECD has analysed the
interrelationship among the first-level indicators
empirically is not clear.
– The OECD indicator for employment protection
only covers the late 1980s,the late 1990s and 2003.
In order to be able to carry out panel analyses, it
would be desirable if the OECD provided longer
and more complete time series.
– Theoretical studies emphasise the analogy be-
tween employment protection regulation and a
tax borne by the employer on employment ad-
justment.The cost implications of the various reg-
ulatory provisions for employees are not mea-sured by the OECD. These costs include sever-
ance payments, costs of litigation, and costs aris-
ing from legally proscribed periods of notice, so-
cial plans, and continued payment of remunera-
tion for employees enjoying protection. Further-
more, there are costs that are borne by society in
general such as unemployment benefits (Jahn
2004, 11). Information on the costs involved in
hiring and firing for businesses are, however, pro-
vided by other organisations such as the World
Bank Group (2005).
Wage setting institutions
Collective bargaining needs to be seen against the
background of wage setting institutions.The extent of
trade union membership and the recognition of unions
as a bargaining agent are to a substantial degree de-
termined by regulations. Union bargaining power is
normally measured by trade union density and collec-
tive bargaining coverage. In addition to these two in-
dicators, the characteristics of the bargaining process
play an important role in the evolution of wages.
Centralisation and coordination of wage bargaining
are considered to be the most important ones.
Trade union density is defined as the ratio of union
members to employed wage and salary workers.
Gross density refers to all union members, including
unemployed and retired members; net density refers
only to employed union members.To measure union
bargaining power, net density is more appropriate
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). In Belgium, Denmark,
Finland and Sweden union density is much higher
than in other countries. This is due to the so-called
Ghent system, whereby unemployment benefits are
administered by union-affiliated institutions. Taken
in isolation union density is not an adequate mea-
sure of union bargaining power. It does not capture
the countervailing power of employer associations,
the degree of competition in the relevant product
markets and the coverage of collective agreements
(Flanagan 1999).
Collective bargaining coverage is defined as the pro-
portion of employees (or production units) whose
remuneration is regulated by collective wage agree-
ments.The wages agreed upon – the so-called union
scales – represent the minimum remunerations.As a
rule, the application of a wage agreement is not lim-
ited to union members.It has become common prac-
tice for employers to apply the terms of collective
contracts to their non-union work force as well.
Otherwise, they might be indirectly promoting un-
ionisation. In addition to voluntary extensions, col-
lective agreements can be generally binding within an
industrial sector by administrative extensions, cover-
ing all employers who are not members of its signato-
ry parties.The scope of collective agreements can al-
so be reduced. Contractual “opt-out clauses” give
management and work councils in individual plants
authority to make wage agreements. In addition to
these legally defined ways, management and work
councils can agree upon deviations from currently
valid wage agreements without the involvement of
the collective bargaining parties or management can
breach the wage agreement unilaterally (Ochel 2005).
Figures on collective bargaining coverage are usual-
ly hard to obtain. For some countries, survey data
exist. In other countries, data on coverage are pro-
vided by bargaining parties. In several countries, no
kind of systematic data collection is undertaken. In
this case, experts have to estimate coverage. In-
formation on illegal practices involving deviations
from collective agreements is not available (EIRO
2002; OECD 2004b).
The degree of centralisation of wage bargaining refers
to the level at which wages are bargained or set.Two
elements must be considered in determining the de-
gree of centralisation. The vertical dimension has to
do with the aggregation of economic activities: wages
can be defined at the company/plant level (decentral),
branch/industry level (sectoral) and at the level of the
entire economy (central). The horizontal dimension
refers to whether workers in different types of jobs
(white-collar and blue-collar jobs, different crafts or
occupations etc.) bargain jointly or separately. The
classification of countries with respect to their bar-
gaining level is complicated by the fact that two or
more levels may coexist and are mutually exclusive.
Or bargaining may occur at multiple levels, in which
case the results of negotiations at the higher levels
have a determining effect on the agreement at lower
levels (Traxler et al. 2001, 112).
In order to determine the degree of centralisation of
wage bargaining it is necessary to obtain information
with respect to the number of employees whose re-
muneration is set at the different levels of negotia-
tion. One approach is only to take into account em-
ployees who receive wages or salaries corresponding
to union scales. Another – more appropriate and
more sensible – approach is to include employees
who receive remuneration above union scales (wage
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drift) or whose pay is not covered by wage agree-
ments. In such cases effective wages are negotiated
individually at the plant level.
The first studies dealing with the degree of centralisa-
tion of wage negotiations were carried out by Came-
ron (1984),Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and others.In
the 1990s the OECD estimated the degree of central-
isation of wage bargaining in member countries for
the years 1980,1990 and 1994.The OECD’s approach
was to assign country scores of 1 (company level), 2
(sector level) and 3 (economy-wide bargaining). In-
termediate scores were assigned in cases in which bar-
gaining occurred at more than one level.Ochel (2000)
carried the OECD studies a step further by analysing
the period from 1960 to 1999.In 2004 the OECD pre-
sented a fivefold classification scheme for the wage
negotiation systems of 25 countries,covering the peri-
od from 1970 to 2000 (OECD 2004b).
In contrast to the centralised approach of the OECD,
Traxler et al. pursue a decentral approach in which
labour relations experts from 20 countries assessed
the wage bargaining system of their country.The as-
sessments were then compared with the existing lit-
erature and discrepancies resolved via discussion
with the specialists. Apart from the vertical dimen-
sion of centralisation (3 levels and mixtures of lev-
els), the horizontal dimension has been also includ-
ed. Bargaining at a given level may occur for all
groups of workers jointly or may be specific to a
group. In all there are twelve categories (Table 5).
The number of employees covered by each of the
different levels is the most relevant criterion for clas-
sification. In 1997-98 the United States, Canada and
New Zealand had the most decentralised bargaining
system (with a score of 1) while Ireland (with a score
of 12) and Finland (11) had the most centralised sys-
tems (Traxler et al. 2001, 114).
Whereas the OECD and Traxler et al.(2001) focus on
the actual level at which bargaining takes place,
Iversen (1999) and Golden et al. (2002) focus on the
structural characteristics of the wage-bargaining pro-
cess. (A survey in greater depth of these approaches
can be found in Kenworthy 2001b.) Iversen seeks to
identify the locus of bargaining authority.His centrali-
sation index combines a measure of organisations and
the share of unionised workers at each of the three
main bargaining levels. The capacity of bargaining
agents to implement their agreements is taken into ac-
count as well. Enforceable agreements presuppose
that bargaining agents control most strike and lockout
funds and can impose fines for non-compliance so that
low-level bargainers cannot circumvent central or in-
dustry level wage agreements. By including the en-
forceability of bargaining agreements,aspects of wage
coordination are combined with elements of centrali-
sation of wage bargaining (Iversen 1999, 83-86).
In much the same way as Iversen, the centralisation
index of Golden et al.(2002) is a measure of the cen-
tralising activities of confederations, rather than of
the degree of wage centralisation itself.Their first in-
dicator is an index of involvement in wage bargain-
ing by peak-level union and employer confedera-
tions (with scores ranging from 1 to 11).The second
is an index of government involvement in the wage
setting process (with scores ranging from 1 to 15).
The third is a summary index of the overall degree of
wage centralisation (with scores ranging from 1 to 4).
The Golden-Wallerstein-Lange index is not a pure
centralisation index but includes elements of wage
coordination.It is the only index taking government-
imposed centralisation and coordination explicitly
into account.Golden et al.make own assessments of
the centralisation of wage bargaining in individual
countries and in this respect their approach is similar
to the OECD’s and Iversen’s.
Another property of wage bargaining is the degree
to which it is subject to coordination. Coordination
can be defined as a mechanism to increase the con-
sensus between the participants in the collective bar-
gaining. The degree of coordination reflects the ex-
tent to which individual wage settlements are in tune
with one another. Or in other words, the extent to
which “minor players deliberately follow along with
what major players decide” (Kenworthy 2001b, 75).
Table 5 
Centralisationof wage bargaining level in the private 
















7x x x x
8x x x x
9x x x
10 x x x
11 x x
12 x x
a) Scores have been reversed so that higher values
indicate greater centralisation.
Source: Traxler et al. (2001), 307.Coordination and centralisation of wage negotia-
tions are not identical.Coordination may occur even
though the negotiations are conducted decentrally.
Coordination processes are complex. They can only
be captured when both horizontal and vertical coor-
dination are taken into account (Moene et al. 1993).
Horizontal coordination aims at harmonising wage
bargaining across distinct jobs and business activi-
ties. Vertical coordination seeks to make the rank
and file follow the decisions taken by their represen-
tatives at higher levels.Apart from these dimensions
of coordination activity it is important that the coor-
dinating activities of the state should not be neglect-
ed (Traxler et al. 2001).
Based on a series of studies reflecting research in
this area, the OECD has estimated the degree of co-
ordination of wage bargaining in its member coun-
tries for the years 1980,1990 and 1994 (OECD 1994a
and 1997). The OECD assigned country scores of 1
(uncoordinated),2 (medium degree of coordination)
and 3 (highly coordinated). Ochel (2000) extended
the OECD results to comprehend the period 1960 to
1999.The trinary assessment scheme does not do jus-
tice to the complexity of the coordination processes.
Neither do these studies provide an explicit rationale
for their coding, although many aspects of coordina-
tion have been taken into account implicitly.
The different dimensions of coordination are taken
into account in OECD (2004b) and in Kenworthy
(2001a).Both the dimension of vertical coordination
as well as the coordination efforts of the state have
their place in the classification of the wage negotia-
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Table 6 










Australia 2 2 Korea 1 …
Austria 4 4 Netherlands 4 4
Belgium (4.5) (4.5) New Zealand 1 1
Canada 1 1 Norway (4.5) (4.5)
Czech Republic 1 … Poland 1 …
Denmark (4) (3.5) Portugal 4 …
Finland 5 4 Slovak Republic 2 …
France 2 2 Spain 3 …
Germany 4 4 Sweden 3 3
Hungary 1 … Switzerland 4 4
Ireland 4 5 United Kingdom 1 1
Italy 4 4 United States 1 1
Japan 4 5
… Data not available.
a) Figures inbrackets are period averages in cases where at least two years differ from the period's modal value.
b) 1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level associations.
2 = Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting.
3 = Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate coordination among major bargaining
actors.
4 = a) informal coordinationof industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations;
b) coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite
agreements, socialpacts), or government impositionof wage schedules;
c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and/or bargaining coordination by large
firms;
d) government wage arbitration.
  5 = a) informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation;
b) coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule /freeze, with
a peace obligation.
c) 1 = Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.
2 = Mixedindustry- and firm-levelbargaining, with little or nopattern setting and relatively weak elements of
government coordination such as setting of basic pay rate or wage indexation. 
  3 = Industry-levelbargaining with somewhat irregular anduncertainpattern setting andonly moderate union
concentration. 
4 = a) Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze,
without a peace obligation (Belgium in most years, and Finland);
b) informal centralization of industry- and firm-level bargaining by peak associations (Italy, Netherlands,
Norway in some years, Switzerland);
c) extensive, regularized pattern setting  coupled with a high degree of union concentration (Germany,  
Austria).
5 = a) centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze,
with a peace obligation (Ireland,Norway insome years);
b) extensive, regularized pattern setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with coordination of
bargaining by influential large firms (Japan).
Sources: OECD 2004 b; Kenworthy (2001 a) and Data set (www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/WageCoorScores.xls).CESifo DICE Report 4/2005 51
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tion systems.The OECD distinguishes nine different
ways of determining wages, which can be summa-
rised in five degrees of coordination (Table 6). In
contrast to the OECD,Kenworthy does not measure
wage coordination per se. His index with five cate-
gories “is instead a hypothesis or prediction about
the degree of coordination that is likely to be gener-
ated by various wage-setting institutions… Because it
focuses on the structural characteristics of the wage-
setting process, it is considerably easier to measure
than is the degree of coordination the process actually
generates” (Kenworthy 2001b, 79-80). Nonetheless,
even with such an approach it is necessary to test the
hypotheses with respect to the degree of coordination.
Traxler et al. (2001) do not estimate the intensity of
coordination directly.Rather,they seek to capture the
coordination activities of the organisations actively
involved in wage negotiations. Since these activities
are qualitatively different from one another,they cre-
ate a categorical coordination indicator. In their view
there are six principal modes of coordination:
– inter-associational coordination by the peaks of
unions and employer associations,
– intra-associational coordination by the peaks,
– pattern bargaining,
– state-imposed coordination,
– state-sponsored coordination, and
– uncoordinated bargaining.
Vertical bargaining governability is measured by the
ability of higher-level agreements to impose wage
moderation on the shop floor.Two types of rules are
most conducive to vertical coordination:the legal en-
forceability of wage agreements and a peace obliga-
tion. Vertical bargaining governability is high when
both these commitments are guaranteed effectively.
Otherwise it is low.Vertical bargaining governability
is present only as far as peak-level coordination is con-
cerned. It is insignificant or pointless in the case of
pattern bargaining,state-imposed coordination and un-
coordinated bargaining.
Traxler et al. (2001) have analysed the effect of their
coordination patterns on labour costs in a panel
study. Peak-level coordination backed by high gov-
ernability as well as pattern bargaining show the
lowest increase in labour costs. State-imposed coor-
dination (and uncoordinated bargaining) shows an
average performance.Peak-level coordination under
low governability leads to the highest increase in
labour costs (Table 7).
Social security and active labour market policy
Social security systems insure workers against the
risk of unemployment and redistribute income in
favour of the most disadvantaged workers (passive
measures of labour market policy).At the same time,
social benefits may reduce peoples’ efforts to look
for a job and increase the reservation wage, thus ex-
erting upward pressure on wages.These effects may
increase the duration of unemployment.
The degree of income maintenance and the financial
work incentives are measured by the difference be-
tween out-of-work and in-work incomes. The ratio
defines the so-called replacement rates. In calculat-
ing replacement rates several choices have to be
made (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). If out-of-
work benefits are seen as an insurance system, then
the numerator would be out of work benefit income
and the denominator would be income from work of
the person whose labour market status changes. If
the living standard out of work as opposed to that in
work is of interest,then in addition all other incomes
that are independent of work status should be in-
cluded in the numerator and the denominator. In this
case a household concept would be appropriate. In
addition one has to decide on the
type of transition: from employ-
ment to unemployment or vice ver-
sa (or transitions into other labour
market states). Finally gross or net
replacement rates can be calculat-
ed, the latter being the more com-
prehensive measure (Immervoll
and O’Donoghue 2003).
The best known net replacement
rates (NRR) are those calculated
by the OECD (2004a).They show
Table 7 






Voluntary peak-level coordination 
with high bargaining governability 
Medium 
Uncoordinated  
bargaining    State-imposed coordination 
Weak    
Voluntary peak-level coordination 
with low bargaining governability 
 Low  Medium  High 
Vertical coordination 
Source: Traxler et al. 2001, p. 247. the proportion of in-work income that is maintained
for someone becoming unemployed. They refer to
persons who were previously employed on a full-
time basis with earnings at 67,100 and 150 percent of
the average production worker wage. As indicators
of net income, they capture the direct effects of all
relevant types of taxes and benefits. Furthermore,
NRR is calculated for different family types taking
into account the household as a whole. Finally, to
capture different durations and time profiles of out-
of-work benefits, replacement rates are calculated
for the initial phase of unemployment as well as for
longer periods of joblessness (up to the 60th month
of benefit receipt).
Although the OECD net replacement rate is one of
the most carefully constructed measuring instruments,
it has some shortcomings.It provides no information
about the proportion of recipients of income re-
placement benefits for which a certain replacement
rate is relevant. What is more, up till now certain
groups of persons have not been included in the cal-
culations. It would, for example, be an advantage if
net replacement rates for economically active per-
sons of different age groups would be calculated.
Net replacement rates and duration of entitlement
alone are not decisive for the incentive effects of a
benefit system. They have to be analyzed together
with the eligibility criteria. Eligibility criteria restrict
social benefits to people who meet requirements
such as independent job search,attending interviews,
accepting suitable work etc.They can be made effec-
tive by strict legislation and by sanctions.The strict-
ness with which the benefit system is operated is de-
scribed in MISSOC, OECD (2000, chapter 4) and
Grubb (2001). Very little information on the imple-
mentation of sanctions is available. Incidences of re-
fusal of benefits are shown in Grubb (2001,Table 2).
Net replacement rates and eligibility criteria represent
the financial incentives to work for persons receiving
income replacement benefits. In 1999, in 16 OECD
countries 18.6 percent of persons of working age fell
into this category. Net replacement rates provide no
indication of the financial incentives to work for per-
sons who are unemployed, but do not receive income
replacement benefits.21.3 percent of persons of work-
ing age fell into this category (OECD 2003, 175).
Besides passive measures,active labour-market poli-
cy measures (ALMP) are carried out in all OECD
countries. The purpose of ALMPs is to provide ac-
tive assistance to the unemployed, which will im-
prove their chances of obtaining work.The ALMP is
registered in terms of expenditure as a share of GDP,
of the total budget for labour market policies, etc.
Further indicators of ALMPs are the numbers of
persons in active labour-market policy measures as
well as people who join or leave these programmes.
The OECD database on Labour Market Programmes
is the most important source.However,it contains no
time series that date back to the 1960s and 1970s.
Also the departures from active labour market poli-
cies are not subdivided according to whether the per-
sons have moved into non-subsidised jobs,into unem-
ployment or into inactivity. This subdivision would
allow conclusions to be made on the effectiveness of
the ALMP (Eichhorst et al. 2001, 198).
Taxing labour
The tax burden on labour has substantial policy rel-
evance.As opposed to the burden on capital income
it has implications for the distribution of income.
Furthermore, it affects the efficiency of the labour
market, influencing both participation rates and un-
employment rates. One way to calculate the tax bur-
den on labour is the Taxing Wages approach of the
OECD (2005).Taxing Wages seeks to determine the
combined effect of personal income taxes, social se-
curity contributions and family cash benefits on the
net incomes of various illustrative family-types and
on the labour costs faced by employers. Information
is provided on employees at comparable levels of in-
come.The main focus is on the “average production
worker”. The calculations in Taxing Wages take no
account of observed data.
The strength of the Taxing Wages methodology lies
in its ability to make international comparisons of
tax systems, without being affected by different pop-
ulation structures.However,it is limited by consider-
ing a restricted number of household types and a
fairly narrow income range.Other limitations are the
exclusion of taxes on the goods that workers con-
sume,the exclusion of non-wage income and the lim-
ited numbers of tax reliefs covered. As social bene-
fits are not included either, Taxing Wages is not the
best source to analyse the incentive for individuals to
participate in the labour market (Heady 2003).
The Taxing Wages approach is not the only way in
which the taxation of labour income can be assessed.
One alternative is to calculate the implicit average
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effective tax rate, by estimating the total amount of
tax paid on labour earnings in a country and dividing
that by an estimate of total wages or labour costs
(OECD 2001). Implicit average effective tax rates
have the advantage of being based entirely on ob-
served quantities,and thus reflect all the factors that
influence the amount of taxes actually paid. Fur-
thermore, they take account of the taxation of all
workers. On the other hand, they do reflect a com-
bination of differences in tax systems and differ-
ences in the population structure, which makes in-
ternational comparisons of tax differences more dif-
ficult (Heady 2003).
Another alternative is to use a micro-simulation mo-
del to calculate labour taxes for a representative sam-
ple of a country’s population. An example of this is
EUROMOD (Sutherland 2001). Micro-simulation
models can provide results for each of the households
in the database that it uses. In principle, they can pro-
duce figures for the taxation of a broad range of in-
comes, although for high-income individuals informa-
tion on tax deductions or tax avoidance is rarely suf-
ficient. Similar to Taxing Wages the simulation of tax-
es paid does not take account of observed data.
The need for more information 
The quantity and quality of information on formal
labour market institutions have improved consider-
ably in the last fifteen years. Nevertheless more in-
formation is still needed.
In the first place, there is a need for more and better
information on areas of regulation which up till now
have not been the object of systematic data collec-
tion.This refers to “new”areas of regulation like “opt-
out clauses” that permit area-wide wage agreements
to be set aside in favour of agreements at the plant
level.Furthermore,it refers to areas that are not well
documented. This applies, for example, to the deci-
sions handed down by labour tribunals and arbitra-
tion boards with respect to employment protection
and to severance pay.Beyond that,increasingly there
are institutional areas that need to be the object of
systematic data collection on account of their indi-
rect effects.An example of this would be the system
of experience rating in the United States and its ef-
fect on protection against wrongful dismissal.And fi-
nally, there are areas of regulation which have up till
now not been subject to systematic data collection
such as wage agreements, the internal arrangements
of organisations and the eligibility requirements with
respect to transfer payments. Sectoral and regional
differences of institutional regulations should also be
captured. An improved state of information in this
respect could enhance the targeting of labour mar-
ket politics.
Apart from the inclusion of new areas of regulation,
implementation of institutional arrangements should
receive more attention.The texts of laws and edicts do
not tell us whether they are actually applied or not.
One country’s strict rules may be paired with lax en-
forcement,whilst another country’s lax provisions may
be applied with greater rigour. Information concern-
ing the implementation of rules and regulations is of-
ten inadequate. An improvement would require that
national administrative entities systematically collect
information on their activities and make this informa-
tion available to international organisations such as
the OECD. International surveys could also help to
improve the situation with respect to information
availability.
Another aspect is the improvement of the methods
employed to obtain information on labour market in-
stitutions.First of all,the theoretical concepts through
which we examine institutions and their activities need
to be further developed and applied.Second,the meth-
ods of measurement need to be improved. The mea-
surement methods should meet, as far as possible, the
criterion of functional equivalence.Whenever decen-
tral assessments of institutional arrangements are un-
dertaken, care should be taken that the national ex-
perts base their assessments on homogeneous criteria.
Whenever the available data are insufficient, interna-
tional surveys should be conducted.And, last but not
least, in calculating composite indicators, a weighting
scheme reflecting the significance of individual indi-
cators should be employed.
Another topic of interest concerns the relevance of
individual institutions. How many people make use
of the services of an institution and how often do
they do this? How many persons are affected by a
given regulatory arrangement? Which set of persons
is covered by a given  indicator? The question of rel-
evance is closely connected to the question of imple-
mentation: if a regulation or a regulatory arrange-
ment is not implemented, then it is not relevant.
Furthermore, wherever possible, long time-series on
the development of labour market institutions should
be provided.These are needed for panel analyses andto identify the extent to which individual institutions
are changeable. Information on the possibilities of
changing formal institutions is of great interest. Be-
yond that, one must attempt to determine the costs
which would be incurred in modifying institutional
arrangements and in overcoming the resistance to
such modifications.Improvement in the availability of
information in this area would require considerable
preliminary research efforts.
Summary
The way labour market institutions have come into be-
ing and the effects that they have are aspects which
have received a good deal of attention, but the collec-
tion of information on such institutions has been much
neglected. Since the 1990s, however, thanks to the
work done at the OECD and other international or-
ganisations and thanks to social science research, con-
siderable progress has been made. The concepts un-
derlying the collection of information about labour
market institutions have been developed further as
has been shown with the examples of employment
protection, wage setting institutions, social security
and ALMP, and taxation of labour. The methods of
measurement have also been improved.
Nonetheless,the need for information is still far from
being completely satisfied.The systematic collection
of information is still not adequate in many areas of
regulatory activity. There is relatively little informa-
tion on the implementation of regulations. Concepts
and methods of measurement must be further devel-
oped. In addition, information concerning the rele-
vance of institutional arrangements is needed. And
finally,the inertial resistance of institutional arrange-
ment to change requires study.
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